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1. Introduction1 
Readers of contemporary political theory, in particular within Anglo-
American academia, will be familiar with thought experiments: they are 
invoked to bring out “our intuitions” about ethically controversial issues, 
such as abortion2; they are employed to test assumptions about politically and 
morally relevant distinctions, such as the one between killing and letting die3; 
and they are introduced to show the inherent limitations of certain 
philosophical doctrines, such as hedonism4. Thought experiments play an 
especially pronounced role in applied ethics and political theory, where they 
serve various interrelated functions, such as stipulating counter-examples, 
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creating mechanisms to tease out the implications of certain positions, 
providing clarification and issuing invitations to re-imagine ago-old 
problems.5 
Broadly, we may define thought experiments as devices that invite the reader 
to examine the normative consequences of a hypothetical situation “if the 
particular state of affairs described in the imaginary scenario were actual”6. 
Thought experiments make present what is absent, and as such they 
structurally resemble narrative art forms, such as novels or films.7 There is 
nothing new about the introduction of hypotheticals. From Plato’s Republic to 
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, imaginary cases have preoccupied philosophers 
a great deal. Naturally, it has always been contested whether the proverbial 
armchair ought to be a privileged spot from which to reason and deliberate 
about politics. But over the past 20 years, a veritable methodological debate 
around the status of thought experiments has unfolded.8 
This paper intervenes into this general debate, which encompasses various 
sub-disciplines in philosophy and political science, from metaphysics to 
International Relations theory, by attempting to parse productive from 
unproductive hypotheticals.9 In focusing on normative political theory, I shall 
touch on three dimensions of thought experiments, namely “what they are; 
how they work; their virtues and vices”10. To tease out some of the account’s 
implications, I will probe a specific case study in more detail – thought 
experiments involving torture – that epitomizes the conditions under which 
imaginary cases might either fail or succeed. 
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My concern with some types of hypothetical builds and expands on a well-
established canon of criticism within political theory, which affirms that 
“artificial cases make bad ethics”11. To this statement, the paper adds that 
some artificial cases make especially bad ethics and politics, by arguing that 
many hypotheticals violate basic premises that ought to be heeded whenever 
the imagination is engaged: they radically disrupt a link with reality as we 
know it, display no concern with human frailty and precariousness and 
foreclose alternative frames of representation. 
While the paper’s thrust is hence mostly critical, I also gesture towards a more 
constructive engagement with thought experiments. As a consequence, the 
paper treads new territory that followers of Henry Shue’s categorical 
indictment against artificial cases have thus far shunned: in affirming that 
some hypotheticals can figure prominently in our normative theorizing of 
complex cases, I reject the whole-sale skepticism and outline a novel defense 
of their usefulness under specific circumstances. The basis of this defense 
resides in a thus far unexplored examination of the frames that conjurers of 
hypotheticals require when constructing their thought experiments. 
The argument proceeds as follows: I start by outlining the framework within 
which my account of productive hypotheticals is situated. This framework is 
based on a democratic view of political theory as a civic activity, which can be 
contrasted with more scholastic strands that advocate pure speculation as the 
ultimate goal of normative reasoning. The next section reconstructs the 
rationale behind the use of hypotheticals in political theory in general and in 
the recent torture debates more specifically. I shall distinguish between 
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“realist” and “clarificationist” defenders of thought experiments and sketch 
their rationales for justifying imaginary cases. I then scrutinize Susan Sontag’s 
and Judith Butler’s exploration of the linkages between framing, the 
intelligibility of human suffering and ethical responsiveness. The main lesson 
to draw from their writings is that frames, far from being innocuous, are 
always the contingent products of specific decisions about the field of 
representability. 12  The penultimate section utilizes this basic, yet 
consequential insight to mark the distinction between “this-worldly” and 
“other-worldly” hypotheticals. I will examine two thought experiments about 
torture (Innocent Jenny as well as the ticking-bomb scenario) and weigh their 
virtues and vices. Finally, the last section elaborates on three objections and 
offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Political Theory and its Audience: A Framework for Thinking 
Through Hypotheticals 
The goal of this section is to propose a primer for thinking through imaginary 
cases in political theory. The debate around the proper use of imaginary cases 
is implicated in discussions around “how to do” political theory.13 The reason 
for this is the following: political theory can, with some justification, be 
exercised without much direct concern for the real world, from the armchair, 
so to say. But, to stick with the metaphor, the ultimate purpose of sedentary 
political theory, its telos, surely is to get the audience moving, to elicit certain 
(positive or negative) reactions from them, to make them perform actions they 
would otherwise not do.14 This is true even if the political theorist herself, 
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wishing the audience to move in a particular direction, stands (or sits) still. In 
other words, although it would be mistaken to insist that political theorists 
must always be directly concerned with action-guidance, we still ought to 
reject the notion that pure speculation is an option for political theory. 
When suggesting that political theory ought to speak to an audience outside 
academe and develop arguments that address wider issues in the public 
debate, I do not mean this to crudely translate into pontificating those who 
have not yet been exposed to normative analysis. Such a perspective would 
have the unfortunate and absurd consequence that political theorists should 
be held accountable in situations where the public completely ignores them, 
which is arguably what happens most of the time. It would furthermore have 
the upshot of symbolically elevating the political theorist above her audience, 
an unattractively elitist image that needs dismantling. 
What, then, does it mean for political theory to speak to an audience in the 
sense described above? The idea is that, since political theorists are concerned 
with practical as opposed to theoretical reasoning, their work is best 
understood as contributing, in various complex and often indirect ways15, to 
discussions “with their fellow citizens as equals” 16 . Yet another way of 
expressing this thought is to describe political theory as “principled social 
criticism”17. Evidently, this does not entail that such a democratic orientation 
towards the public debate would be the only criterion by which we may 
assess political theory’s propositions; but it provides us with a standpoint 
from which we are able to perceive more clearly when and how political 
theorists fail in taking practical reasoning seriously. 
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This is not an uncontroversial view. Amongst others, G. A. Cohen famously 
defended the speculative nature of political theory in asserting that “the 
question […] is not what we should do but what we should think, even when 
what we should think makes no practical difference”.18 Although this paper 
does not directly contribute to the intricate debate around political theory’s 
standing vis-à-vis the real world (often couched in terms of the ideal/non-
ideal distinction or in terms of calls for more “realism” in political theory), 
suffice it here to state that, within the framework informing this essay, a strict 
separation between thinking and acting, as suggested by Cohen, is not a 
desirable aspiration for political theory. 
To apply this point to the essay’s topic: once the driving force behind political 
theory becomes “what we should think”, rather than “what we should do”, 
the very purpose of thought experiments shifts from action-guidance to 
abstract ruminations. As a consequence, the debate in political theory runs the 
risk of becoming overly self-referential and scholastic, detached from the 
wider issues that animate the public debate. Promoting pure speculation is 
hence problematic and should be resisted, especially in cases where the use of 
violence is discussed.19 
The paper’s concrete proposal entails, in a nutshell, that conjurers of 
hypotheticals should primarily strive to enhance the audience’s capacity to 
judge difficult situations in the real world. Productive thought experiments 
engage the imagination in such a way as to enable these judgments. In that 
sense, they can be deemed relevant for our current predicament. When 
hypotheticals fail, they fail for different reasons. I shall distinguish between 
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two archetypical instances: (1) failure to develop “imaginary grip”, i.e. the 
incapacity of a given hypothetical to engage the imagination of the reader or 
viewer; (2) failure to track certain key features of the real world, which must 
not be forfeited in imaginary cases, i.e. the incapacity of a given hypothetical 
to account for what is possible for us, here and now. To further explain the 
heuristic terminology used in this paper, I shall call productive thought 
experiments “this-worldly”, while reserving the term “other-worldly” for 
hypotheticals that do not manage to improve the audience’s capacity to judge 
real-world dilemmas.20 The vices and virtues of concrete thought experiments 
crucially depend, as I shall demonstrate in the following, on the frames that 
political theorists draw on when devising imaginary cases. 
 
3. “Imagine a Situation in Which…”: Observing Torture from the 
Armchair 
Having established the conceptual platform from which the interpretation of 
hypotheticals will be launched, this section explains how thought 
experiments are commonly defended in contemporary political theory. As 
any reader of this literature knows, thought experiments are frequently used 
to fulfil a number of different functions, from illustrating abstract arguments 
to formulating counter-examples. The great variety of imaginary cases within 
the contemporary debate testifies to their vital importance for a discourse that 
stands in some critical distance to the real world. The use of hypotheticals 
plays a chief part in this process for it allows the political theorist to perceive 
and present things from a new, illuminating angle. 
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Beginning a conversation with a phrase such as “imagine a situation in 
which…” opens up a discursive space liberated from the conventions on 
which our comprehension of the real world rests. And yet, whenever 
hypotheticals are introduced in normative political theory, the question 
naturally arises how they relate to the real world – what their precise purpose 
is supposed to be. The reason for this worry is simple. The more we distance 
ourselves from the world as we know it, the more pressing becomes the 
imperative to clarify the imaginary case’s connection with reality. In other 
words, if one of the main goals of hypotheticals is to enable deliberations 
about complex cases, then we need to ensure that the thought experiment is 
sufficiently in tune with the reality to which it speaks, lest it becomes 
irrelevant for the specific situation under scrutiny. 
Imaginary cases involving torture are exceptionally well suited to disclose 
this tension inherent in political theory’s engagement with hypotheticals. The 
most commonly invoked hypothetical in discussions around torture has been 
the so-called “ticking-bomb scenario”21. There are several descriptions of this 
hypothetical, but they all share a roughly similar design: “(1) the lives of a 
large number of innocent civilians are in danger; (2) the catastrophe is 
imminent, therefore time is of the essence; (3) a terrorist has been captured 
who holds information that could prevent the catastrophe from occurring.”22 
The ticking-bomb scenario refers, in short, to a situation in which the absolute 
prohibition of torture ought to be suspended to save innocent lives. 
While the thought experiment has been extensively dealt with in the scholarly 
literature, we still lack a clear sense of why political theorists draw on the 
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ticking-bomb scenario, that is, what kinds of reason they invoke to justify 
their use of it, and similar hypotheticals about torture. I shall suggest that 
defenders of this imaginary case typically come in two varieties. On the one 
hand, there are “realists” 23  whose appeal to the thought experiment is 
intended as an attack on the absolute ban on torture in law and public policy. 
Alan Dershowitz, for example, enthusiastically advocates the issuing of 
“torture warrants” by independent judges because he thinks that in 
exceptional situations interrogational torture would be practiced anyhow. On 
this account, the ticking-bomb scenario is not all that far-fetched – it merely 
dramatizes certain key features of reality to bring out presumably widely held 
ideas about the problem of dirty hands. For realists, the thought experiment 
presents us with an “extraordinarily rare”, but “real and recurring” 24 
situation; far from being the figment of our imagination, it tells us something 
crucial about the way the world actually looks, albeit in especially stark 
colors. Oren Gross, who otherwise objects to Dershowitz’s endorsement of 
torture warrants, concurs with the proposition that hypotheticals like the 
ticking-bomb scenario are “real, albeit rare. Ignoring them completely, by 
rhetorically relegating them to the level of ‘artificial’, is utopian or naïve, at 
best.”25 
Contrast this with what one may call the “clarificationist” camp. 
Clarificationists emphasize that the ticking-bomb scenario is a powerful 
device because it functions as a counterfactual screen against which the moral 
permissibility of torture can be explored. On the clarificationist view, 
hypotheticals involving torture must under no circumstances be mistaken for 
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statements about the real world. Fritz Allhoff makes this point in his defense 
of torture when he stresses that “[m]oral theory is logically distinct from moral 
practice” 26 . The underlying image of theorizing is one of complete 
disconnection from reality. In sharp contrast with authors like Dershowitz or 
Gross, Allhoff and others are thus agnostic as to whether there are actual 
situations that might somehow resemble the set-up of the ticking-bomb 
scenario. Allhoff emphasizes that normative theorizing about torture should 
not, and indeed must not, be conflated with empirical observations about 
how torture works or when it should actually be allowed and implemented.27  
Comparing the realist and the clarificationist interpretations, it becomes clear 
that those who believe the ticking-bomb scenario tells us something about the 
real world employ the hypothetical for radically different reasons than those 
who wish to investigate the moral permissibility of torture via the 
introduction of a thought experiment. Realists refer to thought experiments 
for the purpose of throwing a real and recurring, albeit rare situation into 
sharper relief; clarificationists reject the notion that hypotheticals, such as the 
ticking-bomb scenario, reflect elements of the world as we know it, and insist 
on the counterfactual nature of their inquiry. In each of these camps, the 
imagination is engaged for different reasons: the former use the thought 
experiment to sharpen a specific representation of reality, the latter appeal to 
our sense of the possible so as to shine an unconventional light on a complex 
case. 
If one were to ponder a critical response to each of these defenses of 
imaginary cases, different routes would have to be chosen. A potentially 
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effective rejoinder to the realist position, which will be further explored in the 
paper’s penultimate section, would be to propose that the hypothetical 
fundamentally misconstrues the reality upon which pretends to be reliant. 
Instead of approximating a “real and recurring” situation, the critic could 
point out that the ticking-bomb scenario in fact distorts crucial features of the 
world as we know it. However, this response will obviously not work when 
dealing with clarificationists – they willingly acknowledge that reality is 
much messier than their imaginary cases; which is precisely why it is much 
harder to formulate a cogent answer to the clarificationist camp. 
 
3.1 Clarificationist Strategies in Defending Hypotheticals: Three 
Paradigmatic Positions 
Amongst the most outspoken clarificationist defenders of thought 
experiments about torture, are Frances Kamm28, Uwe Steinhoff29 and Jeff 
McMahan30. In singling out these three authors, I intend to reconstruct the 
conceptual background within which thought experiments typically occupy a 
central place. The point of this reconstruction is not to delve into the minutiae 
of a few imaginary cases, but rather to delineate the rationale behind their 
invocation. 
Kamm’s method aims at the production of hypotheticals whose primary 
purpose is to test moral intuitions. Her main supposition is that these 
intuitions remain stable even when imaginary cases become extremely 
detached from reality. This “technique of equalizing cases” 31  involves 
modifying imagined scenarios such that morally salient factors can be treated 
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discretely and in isolation from each other. In conjuring up thought 
experiments, Kamm thus grapples with intuitions as if they were “fixed data 
points in moral reflection”32. The upshot of this method is the design of 
hypotheticals that certainly stretch the limits of what some would consider 
imaginable.33 Kamm introduces a number of thought experiments to unpack 
the permissibility of torture. Whereas she engages with existing definitions of 
torture, her main interest is to use moral intuitions so as to explore what 
torture is, philosophically speaking.34 
Uwe Steinhoff’s use of imaginary cases resembles Kamm’s. He, too, employs 
hypotheticals to question the absolute ban on torture. Steinhoff suggests that 
torture is justifiable (and not only excusable) on the grounds of self-defense. 
Since people have a right to defend themselves against aggression, this right 
covers both lethal force and torture. Steinhoff’s is a rights-based defense of 
torture. Torturing somebody is not only permissible in “extreme 
emergencies”, when deontological constraints on what we ought to do are 
overridden by utilitarian concerns for saving the innocent in large numbers; it 
is permissible whenever innocent lives are endangered, independent of their 
numbers. His conclusion is neatly summarized in the following paragraph: 
Since people have a right even to kill a culpable aggressor if, in the 
circumstances, this is a proportionate and necessary means of self-
defence against an imminent threat, and since most forms of torture 
are not as bad as killing, then people must also have a right to torture a 
culpable aggressor if this, too, in the circumstances, is a proportionate 
and necessary means of self-defence against an imminent threat.35 
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In order to flesh out this point, Steinhoff draws on a number of thought 
experiments that aim to disprove the position of absolutists. This strategy 
involves the construction of hypotheticals such as Innocent Jenny, who 
engages in what Steinhoff calls “justified self-defensive rape”36 and about 
whom we will hear more at a later stage. The purpose of these examples is 
unmistakable: since absolutists lack the imagination to consider cases that 
challenge their seemingly steadfast commitment to the torture prohibition, we 
need extreme hypotheticals to awaken them from their dogmatic slumber. 
Finally, Jeff McMahan has not only contributed to the reinvigoration of 
analytical Just War theory37, he has recently also reflected on methodological 
issues arising from the torture debates. McMahan concurs with Steinhoff that 
torture cannot be absolutely opposed. Since there is a moral equivalence 
between killing and torturing (in self-defense), it should be acknowledged 
that torturing the culpable to defend the innocent is permissible. 38 
Nevertheless, McMahan does not endorse the legalization of torture. Pace 
Dershowitz, he is adamant about the requirement to separate moral 
permissibility from legal authorization. McMahan hence agrees with those 
who reject attempts to institutionalize torture in the real world. Yet, the 
reason why we should oppose torture warrants is not because torturing as 
such is morally wrong; it is rather that there is a high risk innocent people 
would be wrongly tortured if warrants were in fact issued.39 
What are hypotheticals for, then? Their purpose, according to McMahan, is to 
“filter out irrelevant details that can distract or confuse our intuitions, thereby 
allowing us to focus on precisely those considerations that we wish to test for 
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moral significance”40. Thought experiments clean up the messiness of the real 
world in order to lay bare what the right course of action would ideally be. 
What is more, although he does not proffer any empirical evidence for this 
belief, McMahan maintains that imaginary cases have the potential advantage 
of generating consensus – perhaps even intercultural agreement – as regards 
intuitions about morality. References to historical cases, which have been 
notably present in much of the recent literature on Just War theory, will 
inevitably be tainted by superfluous facts that disorient the moral compass.41 
While there are, of course, considerable differences between Kamm’s, 
Steinhoff’s and McMahan’s positions, they subscribe to a common rationale 
for the use of thought experiment and share family resemblances not to be 
found in the “realist” camp. To characterize these family resemblances, we 
may observe that the following argumentative steps are typically taken to 
defend hypotheticals about torture.42 
1. Since it is an open question whether torture should be absolutely 
prohibited or not, one must interrogate the ban with as much care as 
possible. This requires a “bracketing” of the taboo-like prohibition so 
as to inquire into the moral permissibility of torture. 
2. One way of establishing the moral permissibility of torture is to refer to 
intuitions about other areas of human interaction in which the use of 
force might reasonably be justified, such as self-defense or the defense 
of innocent others. It is assumed that various acts of violence (killing, 
raping, torturing) can be subjected to the same kind of normative 
reasoning. 
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3. Thought experiments can then be designed to test those intuitions by 
eliminating distorting factors in reality. In so doing, they equalize 
otherwise morally over-determined cases and thereby make them 
comparable. 
4. It is normatively irrelevant how far-fetched and outlandish thought 
experiments become – intuitions will remain stable across the spectrum 
between standard and extreme hypotheticals. 
Perhaps the most obvious respect in which this chain of arguments could be 
broken is by questioning the quasi-naïve appeal to intuitions. Kamm in 
particular has been challenged for her heavy reliance on intuitions to 
determine the meaning of torture.43 Yet, intuitions, the objection goes, are not 
simply data points comparable to scientifically observable facts – they express 
particular views that are path-dependent on cultural backgrounds and social 
trajectories. In this respect, it is rather telling that no clarificationist defender 
of thought experiments about torture has ever seriously tried to find out 
whether a “large majority of people from a variety of cultures”44  would 
actually subscribe to the same intuitions regarding violence as an Oxford don 
or Harvard professor. 
This lacuna has been recognized as a major shortcoming in contemporary 
analytical philosophy. Polemically, thought experiments have been labeled 
“intuition pumps”: “fiendishly clever devices” that “cajole you into declaring 
your gut intuition without giving you a good reason for it”45. The burgeoning 
field of experimental philosophy has emerged specifically to compensate for 
the inadequacies of such an unexamined appeal to intuitions, by 
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incorporating findings in psychology and by taking seriously ordinary 
people’s views.46 According to experimental philosophers, it might perhaps 
be possible to establish a commonly shared stance on torture, among ordinary 
people with diverse cultural backgrounds and social trajectories, but such a 
claim would have to be empirically substantiated, rather than simply 
postulated and “proven” through hypotheticals.47 I shall not continue this line 
of criticism. Rather, my subsequent inquiry hones in on modality as the main 
criterion for assessing thought experiments. Before that, however, the paper 
casts a look at the often-ignored effects of framing. 
 
4. The Effect of Frames on the Intelligibility of Suffering 
In this section, I steer our attention to two authors who have grappled in 
depth with representations of violence: Susan Sontag and Judith Butler. My 
argument here is that Sontag’s and Butler’s observations on the linkages 
between framing, the intelligibility of suffering and ethical responsiveness can 
be fruitfully utilized to elucidate imaginary cases, too. This applies not only to 
the debates around torture, but to thought experiments within normative 
political theory more generally. 
Sontag develops her account in a long essay on war photography and later in 
a newspaper article on the human rights violations in the Iraqi Abu Ghraib 
prison.48 In both texts, she is intrigued by the capacity of photography, and 
representations of violence more generally, to either prompt ethical responses 
or foreclose them.49 Sontag begins by suggesting that a “photographic image 
[…] cannot be simply a transparency of something that happened. It is always 
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the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to 
exclude”.50 
The exclusionary act of framing is important for how we perceive wartime 
photography. While it might have been the case in earlier days that wartime 
photography had a cautionary and shocking effect on the audience – during 
World War I, the German photographer Karl Friedrich was stopped by state 
censors from publishing his antimilitarist book Krieg dem Kriege!, with its 
gruesome images of mutilated bodies and wounds to the face, for fear of 
debilitating the national war effort – today, the situation looks patently 
different. Since conflict reporting turned over the past decades into a global 
business for news outlets, “ideologues of photography have become 
increasingly concerned with the issues of exploitation of sentiment (pity, 
compassion, indignation) in war photography and of rote ways of provoking 
feeling”51. The fact that various emotions can be triggered through images, 
that the consumers of reportages are liable to be manipulated by embedded 
reporters, implies that war photography is radically open to abuse. When 
watching pictures of atrocity, different sensitivities can be cultivated: “To 
steel oneself against weakness. To make oneself more numb. To acknowledge 
the existence of the incorrigible.”52 
The chief lesson to take from Sontag is that the frames of violence are 
inherently unstable and open to contestation: they can under favourable 
circumstances render distant suffering intelligible; under unfavourable 
conditions, visual representations of violence simply satisfy, and even 
exacerbate, voyeurism. War photography, or indeed any representation of 
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violence, is never only about documenting historical events. It matters who 
takes the pictures, who makes them available, where they are published, and 
how we look at them.53 
 
4.1 Mitigating the Exclusionary Effects of Frames 
In Precarious Lives and Frames of War, Judith Butler elaborates on some of 
themes studied by Sontag. Her interest lies with the effects of framing on the 
intelligibility of suffering: 
My point […] is to suggest that, whether and how we respond to the 
suffering of others, how we formulate moral criticisms, how we 
articulate political analyses, depend upon a certain field of perceptible 
reality already being established. This field of perceptible reality is one 
in which the notion of the recognizable human is formed and 
maintained over and against what cannot be named or regarded as the 
human, a figure of the nonhuman that holds the place of the human in 
its unrecognizability.54 
This discussion of framing partakes in a larger project of interrogating various 
implications of the War on Terror. Butler scrutinizes the ways in which 
human life can become grievable: when does a human being count as worthy 
of sorrow and empathy? During the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this question has evidently been pressing. Butler surmises that some lives, 
those of the vanquished and oppressed, simply do not appear grievable – at 
least to the Western mind. There is a “hierarchy of grief”55 that makes it 
impossible to recognize those lives as worthy of sorrow and empathy. While 
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Western lives, and in particular those of the victims of the 9/11 attacks as well 
as the soldiers fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been mourned on the front 
pages of widely read newspapers in the USA, Butler observes that “there are 
no obituaries for the war casualties that the United States inflicts, and there 
cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been 
a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that 
qualifies for recognition.”56 
As one commentator has shown, this statement is exaggerated.57 Ever since 
the wars have started, people in the affected countries have of course 
mourned the deaths of their loved ones and compatriots. Butler wants to 
make a point about the field of representability in which violence is enacted, 
perceived and memorialized. Without symbolically disregarding the lives of 
the vast majority of victims in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would have been 
impossible to embark on the mission. In her analysis of torture and 
photography, concentrating in particular on the photos taken in the Abu 
Ghraib prison, Butler explores this thought further: 
[We] cannot understand this field of representability simply by 
examining its explicit contents, since it is constituted fundamentally by 
what is cast out and maintained outside the frame within which 
representations appear. We can think of the frame, then, as active, as 
jettisoning and presenting, and as doing both at once, in silence, 
without a visible sign of its operation and yet effectively. […] Prior to 
the events and actions that are represented within the frame, there is 
an active, if unmarked, delimitation of the field itself, and so a set of 
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contents and perspectives that are not shown, never shown, 
impermissible to show.58 
If such delimitation predates the representation of violence, we may ask 
whether there are standards against which the legitimacy of delimiting the 
representable might be measured and compared. Admittedly, Butler herself is 
not interested in this kind of normative probing59; yet, she still seems to be 
committed to the notion that not all forms of framing are equally innocuous.60 
If the existence of a hierarchy of grief cannot be denied, we should perhaps 
attempt to examine how steep the hierarchy is and how we may eventually 
flatten it. This implies asking whether all non-Western life is barred from the 
realm of compassionate engagement, or whether in exceptional circumstances 
ungrievable life can break through the frames initially set. Indeed, Butler 
highlights the malleability and contestability of what can be represented: 
There are ways of framing that will bring the human in its frailty and 
precariousness into view, allow us to stand for the value and dignity of 
human life, to react with outrage when lives are degraded or 
eviscerated without regard for their value as lives. And then there are 
frames that foreclose responsiveness, to be understood as the negative 
action of existing frames, so that no alternative frames can exist; for 
them to exist and to permit another kind of content would perhaps 
communicate a suffering that might lead to an alteration of our 
political assessment of the current war. 
The lesson of Butler’s approach in general is that novel frames are needed to 
oppose those that make responding to distant suffering impossible. Naturally, 
Unhinged Frames Accepted Manuscript 21 
neither Sontag nor Butler suggests that frames, which are sensitive to the 
suffering of victims of war and torture, on their own would be adequate to 
move spectators to act; much more has to change for violence to subside. Still, 
the idea of bringing the “human in its frailty and precariousness into view” 
provides a good starting point for rethinking the ways in which 
representations might be transformed so as to mitigate the inevitably 
exclusionary effects of framing. 
On the reading of Butler promoted here, the point about foregrounding the 
precariousness and frailty of human life is not to categorically deny that some 
lives are strong and secure, even in extremely adverse conditions. After all, 
we possess ample evidence for heroic resistance to suffering. Rather, Butler 
reminds us that such strong and secure lives are altogether exceptionally rare, 
and that representations of violence that prioritize them should be looked at 
with much scepticism. Ordinary lives, the argument goes, are characterized 
by the distinctive features of precariousness and frailty. 
Butler’s position vis-à-vis the field of representability possesses vital 
implications for our topic: depictions of torture that steer the gaze away from 
the frail and precarious existence of those on the rack do not only 
symbolically harm the tortured, they also perniciously manipulate the 
viewers insofar as they project an incomplete and one-sided picture of reality 
in which the value of some lives is discounted against the value of others. By 
suppressing the humanity of torture victims, such representations, imagined 
or not, perpetuate and entrench political agendas through which outrage at 
violence can be kept at a bare minimum. What is more, some depictions of 
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torture quite literally crowd out alternative frames – the ticking-bomb 
scenario might be a good example of this phenomenon. This is why Butler is 
adamant about the dire need for a multiplicity of frames that would allow the 
interrogation of hegemonic representations of violence. 
In sum, responsiveness to the plight of others, no matter who they are or what 
they have done, is one type of taking action in the face of violence. In this 
sense, responding in ethically appropriate ways to representations of violence 
means literally to stand up for humanity and to resist dehumanizing policies. 
 
5. Modality Matters: An Iconography of This-worldly and Other-
worldly Hypotheticals 
This section asks how Sontag and Butler may help us reflect critically on 
imaginary cases and identify a yardstick to hold apart this-worldly from 
other-worldly hypotheticals. Recall how what I have dubbed “clarificationist” 
defenders of thought experiments maintain that contemporary or historical 
examples taken from the real world are inimical to fine-grained moral 
appraisal because they are suffused with scattered details, some of which 
deserve attention whilst others do not. Real-world cases mix up the 
normatively salient with the normatively extraneous. Imaginary cases, 
however, have the benefit of stripping reality of all superfluous information 
so that intuitions can be tested in an environment free of interference: less 
noise, more sound. 
I have already gestured towards one respect in which this idea can be 
dismantled – by shattering the myth of intuitions as simply given, or as stable 
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even at the fringes of the imaginable, or as widely shared amongst people 
from different cultural traditions. Apart from this route, is there another way 
in which thought experiments could be critically appraised? Sontag and 
Butler open up an alternative path of critique, which has so far remained 
unexplored in the literature. According to their criticism, frames are not 
neutral devices that simply serve the purpose of rendering reality 
representable; they are the products of decisions that can be subjected to 
critical scrutiny.61 
To be sure, thought experiments do not pretend to represent reality; they 
summon us to imagine a moral universe that is different from the one we 
currently inhabit. But in order to do so, they still need to latch onto something 
in the mental space of the readers so as to activate their intuitions, feelings 
and reasons. A thought experiment that does not occupy this mental space 
will lack “imaginative grip”62. 
One way in which hypotheticals might fail would hence be if they invited the 
audience to envision a situation that exceeds their imaginative powers. In one 
sense, such a case would barely qualify as a proper hypothetical: its 
incapacity to move the reader would prevent it from taking off at all. 
Naturally, it remains empirically open to debate whether some of the 
scenarios conjured up by Kamm, Steinhoff and McMahan manage to develop 
imaginative grip or not. It simply depends on the readers’ habits and 
sensibilities whether they will be able to accommodate certain extreme 
hypotheticals in the repertoire of their mental space. But I will assume here 
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that we can accept the invitation to think about torture the way Kamm, 
Steinhoff and McMahan want us to. 
Is there another way in which we could say that some imaginary cases fail to 
achieve what they have set out to do? Perhaps they move the audience, but in 
the wrong direction.63 In the introduction, I stipulated we draw a heuristic 
distinction between “this-worldly” and “other-worldly” thought experiments. 
Here is how this could be fleshed out. Assessing thought experiments 
requires us to look into what kinds of possible world they construct. In 
unpacking this issue, we may distinguish two types of modality 64 
underpinning thought experiments: “possible simpliciter” and “possible for 
us, here and now”. In the following, I explicate in more detail how to separate 
these two kinds of modality, but I shall start here by underlining the relevance 
of imaginary cases. Thought experiments that are possible for us, here and 
now, are relevant in the specific sense that they speak to the world we 
currently inhabit – they address an audience that goes beyond the boundaries 
of academe in view of facilitating the judgment of complex cases. In order to 
remain relevant, these hypotheticals need to incorporate in their set-up 
certain key features that render them recognizable as instantiations of real-
world cases from which they imaginatively depart. Thought experiments that 
are based on what is “possible simpliciter” slide into irrelevance precisely 
because they radically disrupt this crucial link with reality. 
Recall that the conceptual framework within which the distinction between 
this-worldly and other-worldly hypotheticals is made revolves around a 
democratic orientation of political theory as a civic activity. It follows that 
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drawing the line between this-worldly and other-worldly thought 
experiments cannot be done in the abstract – it must be undertaken within the 
context where thought experiments are invoked. What is relevant (i.e. 
possible for us, here and now) can only be established by looking at the real-
world cases that motivate the creation of thought experiments. There can thus 
be no other generic yardstick for probing the merits of hypotheticals, apart 
from their capability to enhance the judging of real-world problems. It is 
because imaginary cases ought to be seen through this lens that we need to 
base our assessment of their virtues and vices on context-specific factors that 
either facilitate or impede action-guidance. 
Framing plays a crucial part of this process. Sontag and Butler have 
demonstrated that the frames employed to represent violence are themselves 
the products of decisions about what can, and what cannot, be shown in any 
given context; what is being left out is as important as what is being revealed. 
Examining the frames of hypotheticals, their set-up, is so essential because 
“[t]he value of hypotheticals depends on the extent to which they track the 
critical features of the problem that a moral agent actually faces. To argue 
from a case that does not track the critical moral features of the relevant 
context disorients both the moral and the legal issues that the hypothetical is 
designed to illuminate”65. In other words, some frames become unhinged 
from reality and thereby forfeit their claim to being relevant. Butler’s 
insistence that precariousness and frailty are distinctive features of human life 
discloses a criterion by which we may be able to assess the tracking-function 
of thought experiments.  
Unhinged Frames Accepted Manuscript 26 
 
5.1 Exemplars of Irrelevance and Other-Worldliness 
Thus far, I have largely refrained from grappling with thought experiments in 
detail so as to focus on the theoretical rationale behind their design. But at this 
stage a closer look at two examples will assist us in more sharply demarcating 
the boundary between “this-worldly” and “other-worldly” thought 
experiments. The first is Steinhoff’s discussion of self-defensive rape, which 
he admits is not for the “squeamish”. The reference to rape occurs at a crucial 
fork in the argument when Steinhoff investigates the permissibility of torture. 
Recall that the right to self-defence serves as the normative basis for justifying 
torture: if we grant that it is under certain conditions allowed to kill someone 
(namely when one needs to defend oneself or an innocent other), then we 
ought to admit, for exactly the same reason, that torturing someone can be 
permissible, too. 
How about raping somebody, then? Several authors have intimated that 
pushing the rights-based argument further to also include rape would 
eventually lead to the collapse of the argument from self-defence.66 To sustain 
the coherence of the rights-based defence of torture, Steinhoff is thus forced to 
claim that the justification from self-defence can be extended to a case like 
rape. He tries to achieve this by introducing the following thought 
experiment: 
Innocent Jenny, naked in her bedroom, is attacked by Serial Killer, who 
has broken in. He, too, is naked. Jenny, who is a doctor, is currently 
treating her vaginal infection with a potent new ointment, which has 
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the side-effect of killing any man whose penis is exposed to it long and 
severely enough, something best achieved by sexual intercourse. While 
the killer is trying to strangle her, they are wrestling on the ground, she 
gets on top of him, and he gets his hands on her throat and squeezes. 
In her desperation, she shoves the aggressor’s penis – while the 
aggressor explicitly says “No!” – into her vagina and starts to move up 
and down while the man still strangles her. But suddenly the ointment 
works, the man goes into shock and dies. Jenny is safe.67 
I shall suppose that it is uncontroversial to deem this an extreme thought 
experiment. One likely reaction to Innocent Jenny would be to state it is 
simply too eccentric to tell us anything meaningful about self-defence at all.68 
The rejoinder could be that philosophers making up hypotheticals like 
Innocent Jenny are toying around with imaginary cases without 
acknowledging the severity of the moral problems involved. Innocent Jenny, 
then, might reveal a disparity between what is morally at stake in a given 
situation, and how (some) philosophers talk about it. On this account, if 
someone tried to show, through intricate thought experiments, that the 
absolute prohibition of torture (or rape) should become an object of 
discussion, the proper attitude would be to interrupt the conversation and 
stop deliberating altogether.69 
Another way of countering a case like Steinhoff’s would be to insist that, 
whilst being peculiar, the thought experiment constructs a situation that is 
conceivable, but only barely so. The phrase “only barely so” indicates that the 
modality underlying Innocent Jenny should be considered problematic. We 
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may hence grant that, in a very distant world, rape could be envisaged as a 
means of self-defence and that Steinhoff has been successful in imagining 
such a world. Yet, that statement in itself remains vacuous until we raise a 
series of subsequent queries: What follows from this hypothetical? What 
lessons should we draw from it? Where lies its action-guiding element? How, 
if at all, does it help us make judgments about real-world dilemmas? 
The answer to these questions appears to be that, even though Innocent Jenny 
testifies to Steinhoff’s vivid mind-set as regards sexual violence, it does not 
necessarily succeed in changing established ideas about the wrongness of 
rape or torture, for that matter. Just because an elaborate counter-example is 
construable does not mean that a general norm needs to be revised.70 It can be 
doubted whether many readers of Innocent Jenny would upon reflection 
come to the conclusion that their pre-conceived intuitions about rape were 
wrong beforehand – that they should now deem it likely that in situations of 
self-defence, such as Innocent Jenny, raping somebody would be morally 
permitted. 
To put this point more sharply, as an imaginary case, Innocent Jenny is 
unhinged from reality and irrelevant precisely because it features an aspect of 
rape that is entirely absent in all actual cases of rape, namely self-defence. 
Hence, while it presents us with a scenario that is imaginable and can be said 
to possess imaginary grip, its practical value for judging real-world cases is 
negligible. Common sense tells us that in all incidents of real-world rape the 
characteristic feature of self-defence is absent, which is why Innocent Jenny is 
not possible for us, here and now. This aspect has ramifications for the debate 
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around torture. If the justification of torture depends, at least partially, on an 
argumentative analogy between various types of defending oneself (or 
innocent others) against aggression, then Innocent Jenny simply does not 
succeed in establishing a chain of equivalence. 
Having grappled with an unambiguously extreme hypothetical, let us now 
turn to a prima facie less outlandish and bizarre one – our second example. It is 
plausible to presume that the ticking-bomb scenario discussed above is much 
closer to the world as we know it than Innocent Jenny. Realists like 
Dershowitz and Gross underscore this idea, and it seems true that the 
assumptions embedded in it are modally closer to reality than the ones made 
by Steinhoff. It is also beyond doubt that the ticking-bomb scenario possesses 
imaginative grip, as various TV shows and movies have shown. Should we 
hence conclude that the ticking-bomb scenario is, using the terminology 
introduced above, this-worldly and perhaps even benign? Does it articulate a 
possibility for us, here and now, as Dershowitz and Gross want us to believe? 
One way of resisting this conclusion would be to reveal the seriously flawed 
suppositions on which the ticking-bomb scenario rests. Along these lines, Kim 
Lane Scheppele demonstrates that the hypothetical fundamentally 
misconstrues four crucial features of reality that one ought to account for – 
even in a possible world:  
First, the hypothetical assumes that you (as the moral agent to whom 
the hypothetical is directed) and the terrorist are alone in the world. […] 
There is no institutional context; neither state nor society appears in 
this picture. But of course in any real-world context, the choice would 
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be made in an institutional setting by those charged with the 
responsibility to fight terrorism. 
Second, the hypothetical assumes an extraordinary degree of clarity 
about the situation in which you […] find yourself when the question 
of whether to torture arises. […] Such certainty may be hypothetically 
possible, but it will likely never exist. 
Third, the hypothetical assumes that the person to be tortured is the one 
(perhaps even the only one) who knows where the ticking bomb is. […] 
Instead, the more likely question will be whether the person to be 
tortured really knows anything useful at all. 
Finally, the hypothetical assumes that if the captured person gives you 
the information after being tortured, the information will in fact be true 
and useful in defusing the bomb. Yet torture produces results that are 
highly unreliable.71 
Should Scheppele’s interpretation of the hypothetical’s assumptions be 
accurate, as various authors seem to have confirmed72, we might be inclined 
to determine that the ticking-bomb scenario shares more with Innocent Jenny 
than initially suspected. In other words, although it appears to be modally 
closer to reality, it turns out to be as other-worldly as Steinhoff’s hypothetical. 
On this interpretation, the imaginary case, whilst frequently invoked in the 
academic as well as the public sphere, is so far detached from what could 
reasonably be expected to happen in the real world that its merit in guiding 
action becomes dubious.  
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The real challenge, then, for those devising imaginary cases is not whether 
they can conjure up a situation that is within the realm of the possible; with 
the right kind of training in analytical philosophy it should be expected that 
they will manage to do so. Rather, for political theorists engaged in the kind 
of civic activity outlined in the essay’s introduction the crux is to what extent 
the thought experiment helps us navigate the complex moral universe we 
currently inhabit.73 
 
6. Diagnosing Failures and Outlining Success Conditions 
I have intimated that this-worldly hypotheticals are thought experiments that 
express what is possible for us, here and now; other-worldly hypotheticals, 
then, are thought experiments that express what is possible simpliciter. This 
division leads to another issue: whether the vices and virtues of hypotheticals 
depend exclusively on their modal relation to the real world. In other words: 
are all this-worldly hypotheticals benign, and, conversely, are all other-
worldly thought experiments pernicious? 
The distinction between this-worldly and other-worldly does not fully map 
on the distinction between benign and pernicious thought experiments. To 
explain why this is so we must again reflect on action-guidance. As explained 
above, the capacity of thought experiments to enable judgments is an 
indicator of their merit. If a hypothetical fails to contribute to our judging of 
real-world cases due to its irrelevance, it should be considered pernicious. 
But, crucially, there are two sorts of failure in this regard, which elicit 
different evaluative responses. An imaginary case might fail to offer action-
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guidance because it does not succeed in engaging the imagination at all. This 
is what happens when thought experiments do not manage to develop 
“imaginative grip” from the outset. A hypothetical might be so outlandish 
and bizarre that the sheer distance between the possible and the actual world 
undercuts the readers’ ability to draw any kind of lesson from it. Some 
extreme hypotheticals resemble science-fiction more than anything else, and 
could therefore be considered entirely benign.74 They might not proffer any 
assistance in judging real-world dilemmas, but neither do they exert any 
detrimental impact on our ability to judge. 
A second sort of failure is more serious for it might destabilize, or even 
corrupt the ability to judge. Innocent Jenny might be thought to fall into this 
category. A hypothetical like Steinhoff’s presents us with a case of “rape” that 
can have a distorting effect on the practical wisdom of those who have learnt 
to recognize that raping somebody simply cannot be an act of self-defence. 
While it is, of course, conceivable to envisage “rape” along Steinhoff’s lines, 
the problem with the thought experiment is not so much that it is purely 
speculative and possesses no practical value whatsoever when it comes to 
informing judgments about quandaries in the real world; rather, one could 
object that it evokes a possible world in which we are invited to demolish the 
taboo-like character of rape and, by implication, torture. So, in this case we 
are dealing with a thought experiment that potentially has “imaginative 
grip”, but its effects on the audience should be deemed deleterious. Innocent 
Jenny engages the imagination of the readers, but it does so in a problematic 
fashion. 
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If neither an extreme hypothetical such as Innocent Jenny nor an apparently 
less outlandish one like the ticking-bomb scenario manages to sustain a link 
with the world as we know it, how about this-worldly thought experiments, 
then? Can there be productive hypotheticals about torture that are relevant to 
the audience and speak to our world, here and now? As should be obvious 
from the preceding sections, this paper has not opposed the use of thought 
experiments per se, but rather targeted more specifically those hypotheticals 
that fail to offer action-guidance. It follows that some imaginary cases, 
provided they develop imaginative grip, sustain a symbolic link with the real 
world and enable the judging of difficult situations, must be considered 
benign. However, to my knowledge such a thought experiment cannot be 
found in the existing literature. Instead of now attempting to construct a this-
worldly hypothetical, I shall outline the success conditions it would have to 
satisfy to qualify as productive. 
The suggestion is that, if one were to transform other-worldly thought 
experiments about torture into this-worldly ones, one ought to be primarily 
guided by Butler’s admonition to bring “the human in its frailty and 
precariousness [comes] into view”. As we have observed, Butler stresses the 
creation and transformation of frames that give prominence to the dignity of 
victims, no matter who they are or what they have done. Only such novel 
frames, which often are reactions to hegemonic depictions of muted and 
invisible suffering, will enable the viewers to express outrage at torture 
practices and recognize the value of all lives. 
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This argument is especially poignant when dealing with the clarificationist 
defence of imaginary cases. Recall Kamm’s and McMahan’s argument about 
the advantageous epistemic set-up of hypotheticals, compared with historical 
or contemporary cases – they strip the real world of superfluous, morally 
overdetermined information and thus facilitate normative reasoning. The 
error that many clarificationists commit, however, is that they do not include 
in their moral universe an acknowledgement of the suffering of those on 
whom interrogational or self-defensive torture would be exercised. This idea 
is central for the case argued in this paper because it once again underlines 
the intrinsic connectedness of imaginary cases with the world as we know it. 
Butler teaches us that frailty and precariousness are features that all human 
being share; as such they can either be accentuated through responsible 
frames or obfuscated through manipulative ones. 
At first sight, this argument seems vulnerable to the objection that 
clarificationists draw on thought experiments about torture to highlight how 
much human suffering can potentially be averted by torturing a culpable 
suspect, be it in self-defence or in defence of innocent others. Hence, a critic 
could accuse my emphasis on the suffering of those on whom interrogational 
or self-defensive torture is imposed of misunderstanding the counterfactual 
nature of the imaginary case. 
However, the point to be taken from Butler’s discussion is not that the 
suffering of the tortured must somehow “trump” the suffering of potential 
victims; ranking one form of human frailty over another would simply 
replace a hegemonic hierarchy of grief with an alternative one, which would 
Unhinged Frames Accepted Manuscript 35 
be a self-defeating enterprise and a mistaken reading of the literature on 
framing. At no point does this literature intimate we ought to prioritize the 
fragility of the tortured over the fragility of victims of terrorism. The idea is, 
rather, to try to set them on an equal footing, which some thought 
experiments simply do not do. Butler admonishes us that certain hegemonic 
frames condemn the suffering of some victims to the side-lines, by completely 
silencing their susceptibility to pain. This is exactly what happens in the vast 
majority of thought experiments about torture. The very design of these 
imaginary cases – from the ubiquitous ticking-bomb scenario to Innocent 
Jenny – makes it impossible to perceive even a trace of the precariousness that 
characterizes human life. 
Obviously, conjuring up hypotheticals that heighten awareness of these 
aspects of humanity is not an easy exercise. To remain relevant, productive 
thought experiments about torture would have to attempt to strike a 
precarious balance between abstracting from the real world so as to put into 
clearer focus the complex issue under scrutiny, and maintaining a symbolic 
link with the world as we know it. The main anchor of this link should be the 
recognition of human frailty and precariousness, without which the modal 
distance between real and imagined world becomes too extensive. Yet, as this 
section has tried to argue, if we wish to defuse the wholesale scepticism 
raised by Henry Shue – that artificial cases in general are deleterious to 
normative reasoning – then we have no choice but to reflect on thought 
experiments that are possible for us, here and now. 
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7. Three Objections and a Conclusion 
Three objections can be mounted against this paper. The first, concerning the 
scope of the paper, can be dealt with quite swiftly. The perspective from 
which I have analysed thought experiments is, of course, not unanimously 
shared by all political theorists. Especially those who subscribe to the view 
that political theory can and ought to deal in speculation rather than action-
guidance will probably find much to disagree with in this essay. This is likely 
the case due to incompatible starting assumptions. I thus hope that readers 
adhering to the “pure speculation”-strand will be able to appreciate the 
claims defended in this paper against the backdrop of my own fundamental 
assumptions about the role of political theory. 
Secondly, clarificationists could counter my proposal by affirming the 
distinction between theory and practice, as Allhoff does. Their rejoinder 
might look like this: 
Naturally, we believe that torture is terrible and that we would be 
better off without it; we do not rejoice in the suffering of human 
beings, after all. But, sadly, we can’t stop here. In order to understand 
the phenomenon of torture better, we need to know whether it is wrong 
in all circumstances, and that’s where thought experiments can help us 
a great deal. Hypotheticals free us from the gut reactions we 
experience when absorbing stories about actually occurring torture 
practices and thereby allow us to investigate, more rationally and less 
emotionally, what is morally going on. 
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There are at least two flaws with this line of explanation. Firstly, given our 
current knowledge about the pervasiveness of torture practices around the 
world, maintaining the distinction between moral permissibility and legal 
authorization, as McMahan for example does, will simply not be enough.75 If 
one is fully aware of the widespread use of torture and if one has learnt to 
appreciate that torture is abhorrent and condemnable (which in itself must be 
recognized as significant historical progress), why would one be tempted to 
make up a modally remote case in which torture were suddenly, under 
extraordinary circumstances, permissible? What should the audience do with 
intuitions tested in a situation that shares close to nothing with the real world, 
such as Innocent Jenny? The determination to sharply separate theory from 
practice hence sets the debate on the wrong track from the beginning. This 
paper has tried to correct this regrettable mistake. 
Secondly, even if we subscribed to the strict distinction between moral 
knowledge and action, the problems identified above prevent the meaningful 
exercise of judgment in cases where the modality underpinning the thought 
experiment is other-worldly. The loss of imaginative grip, the neglect of a 
concern with human frailty and precariousness, as well as the foreclosing of 
alternative frames of representation incapacitate the faculty of judging in 
general, and of judging complex issues of political violence in particular. This 
is especially clear in a case like Innocent Jenny where the inference of 
permissible rape crucially depends on a posture of self-defense that is a 
theoretical possibility, but not a practical one. 
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One might, thirdly, object to my argument that thought experiments are not 
only “intuition pumps” – they serve as wake-up calls for reconsidering ago-
old problems that have become somewhat calcified. The conjurers of what I 
have named “other-worldly” hypotheticals might hence respond to my 
criticism that thought experiments, such as Innocent Jenny, are intended to 
kick-start the debate anew, to make us think harder about the problem of 
torture. Along Millian lines, they might suggest that the prohibition of torture 
has become an unexamined dogma, a taboo of sorts, that needs constant 
probing as much as any other societal norm. Sometimes extreme 
hypotheticals are indeed defended on the grounds that they estrange readers 
from the current situation so as to make them perceive more clearly what the 
values are that inform their practices.76 My argument for restraining other-
worldly hypotheticals might thus be associated with a conservative spirit, 
desiring to legislate certain boundaries of the imagination that ought to 
remain utterly open. 
While such re-imaginings are crucial for societies to continuously explore 
their core commitments, it matters what it is that the readers are being 
estranged from. If the estrangement reaches a level so radical that the very 
basis of core commitments becomes shaky, we run the risk of rendering the 
moral world we inhabit unstable. The paradox this paper sought to explore is 
simple to state in theory, but hard to resolve in practice: whereas forcing us to 
see norms, such as the ban on torture, in a new light is one of the exceptional 
virtues of such hypotheticals, the drive towards cases that are more and more 
remote from the world as we know it is one of their inherent vices. 
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To reiterate a point made earlier: the arguments developed in this paper are 
not directed against all hypotheticals – as I tried to show, the idea that all 
“artificial cases make bad ethics” is misguided, or at least under-explained. 
This realization still leaves substantial room for debate around which kinds of 
imaginary case we wish to promote in political theory. But I have also 
suggested that this room is not limitless. Naturally, it remains contestable 
whether a concrete thought experiments is framed in such a way as to enable 
judgments of complex cases or not. Yet, an answer to the question whether, 
for example, Rawls’s “original position” is a productive hypothetical can only 
be given by examining the concrete context within which the imagination is 
engaged. Again, the framework undergirding this paper does not allow for an 
a priori assessment of all imaginary cases, but it permits us to orient our 
reflections when we assess the merits of thought experiments in political 
theory. 
This is why it is so vital to uphold the distinction between the two kinds of 
modality outlined in this paper: possible for us, here and now, and possible 
simpliciter. Without it, the imagination is free to flow, but we would be 
deprived of a means to deliberate on when and why thought experiments go 
wrong, and, conversely, when and why they help us navigate the moral 
universe we currently inhabit. 
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1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Political Theory Research 
Group meeting in Edinburgh (2015), the PSA General Conference in Sheffield 
(2015) and the APSA General Conference in San Francisco (2015). I am 
grateful to the audiences of all these events for their excellent questions. 
Special thanks are due to Philip Cook, Liz Frazer, Dustin Howes, Kim 
Hutchings, Moya Lloyd, Mihaela Mihai, Kieran Oberman and Alan Wilson, 
who have read various/different versions of this paper and proposed highly 
perceptive and helpful feedback. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the three 
referees of this journal for suggesting many improvements to the original 
manuscript. Finally, I wish to thank Rob Johns for expertly navigating the 
paper through the review process and for generously offering guidance 
throughout. The usual disclaimers apply. 
The research for this paper has benefited from a Marie Curie Career 
Integration Grant (JUDGEPOL). 
2 See most famously Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article on abortion, in which she 
conjures the image of a famous and talented violinist whose life depends on 
being plucked into the renal system of another person: Thomson 1971. 
3 Certainly the most prominent example is the so-called “trolley problem”: 
Foot 1967. On the wider impact of the “trolley problem”, which has had an 
astonishingly steep career, see: Edmonds 2013. 
Unhinged Frames Accepted Manuscript 41 
                                                                                                                                      
 
4 Robert Nozick’s “experience machine” is a good example for this kind of 
imaginary case. See: Nozick 1974, 42–45. 
5 Walsh 2011, 471–472. 
6 Walsh 2011, 469. 
7  Due to space constraints, this essay will have little to say about the 
relationship between thought experiments in the academic literature and 
narrative art forms. However, I believe that one crucial difference between the 
two is that novels and films usually tell much richer and complex stories than 
the ones constructed in scholarly discourse. On the potential of literature to 
contribute to, and further advance moral knowledge see: Carroll 2002. 
8  The most comprehensive survey of thought experiments that has kick-
started this methodological debate is: Sorensen 1992. 
9 For a good overview of this debate, including a useful bibliography, see: 
Brown and Fehige 2014. For the use of counterfactuals in International 
Relations theory see: Lebow 2010; Tetlock and Belkin 1996. For two defences 
of thought experiments in the realm of applied ethics and political theory see: 
Miščević 2013; Walsh 2011. 
10 Sorensen 1992, 3. Several authors have tried to explore where and how 
thought experiments go wrong. This paper seeks to build on their findings 
and apply them to the discussion around torture. See: Brendel 2004; Walsh 
2011. 
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11 Shue 1978, 141. Aside from Shue’s seminal paper from the 1970s, see in 
particular: Bufacchi and Arrigo 2006; Luban 2009; Shue 2006. 
12 To avoid a misunderstanding from the start: I refer here to framing in a 
sense that is distinct from how the term is employed in behavioral economics 
or cognitive psychology. Framing, throughout this paper, means the ways in 
which certain salient facts are represented in a thought experiment. 
13 I am referring here to the debate around the relationship political theory 
ought to entertain with the real world. The debate is usually organized 
around the correct interpretation of Rawls’s “ideal-non-ideal” distinction, or 
around the nascent features of realist political theory. Since I fear that 
grappling with this literature in more detail would distract me from the 
overall ambition of this paper, I shall be obliged to only hint at it en passant. 
For some notable publications see: Farrelly 2007; Geuss 2008; Gilabert 2011; 
Mills 2005; Valentini 2012. 
14 My understanding of political theory as speaking to an audience has been 
inspired by Bernard Williams’s reflections on the “listeners” to whom 
political theorizing is addressed. With Williams, I believe that political theory 
can only fulfil its vocation of being heard if its diagnoses and prescriptions 
somehow link up with the self-interpretations of those who have been 
implicitly or explicitly spoken to. (To complicate matters however, Williams, 
uses the term “audience” in a more technical sense for those those who will 
likely actually read the text. While this distinction between “listeners” and 
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“audience” might perhaps make sense in some regards, it is not substantial to 
my argument.) See: Williams 2005, 56–60. 
15  The compound phrase “complex and often indirect” is crucial for my 
interpretation of how political theory ought to speak to its audience. Since I 
do not advocate pontificating the public as a desirable outlook for political 
theorists, I merely seek to reject a vision of political theory that is radically 
opposed to action-guidance altogether. In the next paragraph, I call this the 
“pure speculation”-strand in normative political theory. 
16 Tully 2008, 8. On this point, see especially: Laden 2011. 
17 Shapiro 2005, 173. 
18 Cohen 2008, 268. 
19 For a biting critique of scholastic reason more widely see: Bourdieu 2000. 
20  The terminology mirrors, in some respects, Jakob Elster’s distinction 
between realistic and outlandish cases in ethics. While I find his argument 
largely persuasive, I reject his conclusion that the criterion of action-guidance 
cannot be enlisted for assessing thought experiments. See: Elster 2011. 
21 For an excellent discussion of the emergence of the ticking-bomb scenario as 
the focal point of discussions around torture see: Farrell 2013. 
22 Bufacchi and Arrigo 2006, 358. 
23 In using the term “realist” to characterize Dershowitz’s position, I do not 
mean to suggest that he indeed captures the reality of torture accurately. On 
the contrary, I agree with critics such as Bob Brecher, who have shown that 
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Dershowitz pays astonishing little attention to how torture works in fact. The 
moniker “realist” rather signifies that on this reading the ticking bomb 
scenario is intended to depict a stylized version of reality. See: Brecher 2007, 
14–39. 
24 Dershowitz 2002, 140. 
25 Gross 2004, 234. 
26 Allhoff 2005, 247. 
27 For those inclined to be swayed by the standard terminology in normative 
political theory, in Rawlsian terms, Allhoff’s move could be associated with 
asserting the priority of ideal over non-ideal theory. See: Rawls 1999, 215–218. 
28 For our purpose see especially: Kamm 2008. 
29 Steinhoff 2013. 
30 McMahan 2008. 
31 Kamm 2008, 427. 
32 Brand-Ballard 2007. 
33 Consider the following hypotheticals, which are all supposed to unearth 
distinctions relevant to terrorism:  
Suppose that a pilot mistakenly believes that the people on the ground 
are cows. He has no intention of harming and terrorizing people but 
only of bombing a building to harm some cows in order to terrorize 
other cows into trampling a munitions site. […] 
Unhinged Frames Accepted Manuscript 45 
                                                                                                                                      
 
We bomb some trees because we know that people will think we are 
trying to kill them and they then become terrorized and pressure for a 
change of policy. However, we do not and would not harm anyone. 
[…] 
[C]onsider releasing a flock of butterflies over an opponent’s 
population when we know they are very (irrationally) frightened of 
butterflies. This involves taking advantage of their irrationality and so 
is demeaning in a way that reasonable and truth-produced terror is 
not. Trying to get people to behave in a cowardly way is also preying 
on their imperfections. 
(Kamm 2006, 42, 52, 55.) 
34 One of the main tools she employs is the trolley case, which plays a crucial 
role in the investigations of all clarificationists. See: Kamm 2008, 89. 
35 Steinhoff 2010. The idea that killing might be worse than torturing has been 
criticized by Henry Shue in his seminal paper on torture. See: Shue 1978, 129–
130. 
36 Steinhoff 2013, 149. 
37 McMahan 2002; 2009. 
38 McMahan forthcoming, 6–8. 
39 McMahan forthcoming, 11. 
40 McMahan forthcoming, 3. 
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41 Most famously, Michael Walzer can be credited for creatively combining 
the interpretation of historical cases with normative reasoning around 
warfare. Revisionist Just War theorists, like McMahan, position their whole 
project in opposition to Walzer’s. See: Walzer 2006. 
42  To be sure, I am not claiming here that all clarificationists explicitly 
subscribe to the same positions. Rather, my goal is to distill, from a variety of 
authors, the ideal-typical rationale behind a specific defense of thought 
experiments. This is a heuristic exercise that seeks to condense the positions of 
clarificationists into a coherent view. 
43 Wisnewski 2014, 658–659. 
44 McMahan forthcoming, 3. 
45 Dennett 1991, 282, 397. 
46 For a good overview of the field in general see: Knobe and Nichols 2008. On 
experimental philosophy and moral reflection see: Alfano and Loeb 2014. 
47 To my knowledge there is only one paper in experimental philosophy that 
tangentially touches on the torture prohibition, in the context of an analysis of 
ordinary people’s views on intentionality: Cova and Naar 2011. There is also a 
deeper worry about the politics of appealing to intuitions: that they simply 
cover up traces of power and privilege that need to be scrutinized critically. 
For an insightful discussion of the problematic use of intuitions about justice 
see: Geuss 2008, 101–103. 
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48  Sontag 2003; 2004. These texts are based on Sontag’s earlier work on 
photography: Sontag 1977. 
49 Although Sontag does not reference them, social scientists have for some 
time been critically examining the relationship between distance and 
suffering against the backdrop of a transformed media landscape. See for 
example: Boltanski 1999; Cohen 2001. 
50 Sontag 2003, 46. 
51 Sontag 2003, 80. 
52 Sontag 2003, 98. 
53 This uncontroversial observation is essential because Sontag maintains that 
photography is not the right medium for enhancing our understanding of 
violence at all. But images are exceptionally useful for remembering trauma: 
“Harrowing photographs do not inevitably lose their power to shock. But 
they are not much help if the task is to understand. Narratives can make us 
understand. Photographs do something else: they haunt us.” (Sontag 2003, 
89.) 
54 Butler 2009, 64. 
55 Butler 2004, 32. 
56 Butler 2004, 34. 
57 Zehfuss 2009. 
58 Butler 2007, 953. 
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59  Butler’s methods of choice are deconstruction and genealogy. On her 
specific interpretation of genealogy see: Stone 2005. 
60 My reading of Butler as supplying the basis for a normative analysis of 
framing might be criticized for misrepresenting her understanding of norms. 
It has indeed been demonstrated that Butler is most interested in exploring 
the nexus between norms and violence, or, in what Terrell Carver and Samuel 
Chambers call “normative violence” (2008, 75–91.) Butler’s interpretation of 
torture photography traces the link between norms and violence as well. 
61 For example, although she remained outside the frame, the woman who 
took the photos in the Abu Ghraib prison, Specialist Sabrina Harman, clearly 
played a role in the depicted reality – a fact for which she was later sentenced 
to a prison sentence and discharged from the United States Army for bad 
conduct. See: Gourevitch 2008; Morris 2008b. Errol Morris has also made a 
documentary about the role of photography in the war on terror: 2008a. 
62 Walsh 2011, 469. 
63 The following observations resonate with, and are inspired by Timothy 
Chappell’s insight that “the most important thing that distinguishes good 
ethical thinking about torture from bad ethical thinking about torture is not 
adherence to any particular moral theory. Rather, the key difference is the 
deployment of the moral imagination in such thinking. How do we deliberate 
well about acting badly? A key part of the answer is with our imaginations 
engaged.” (Chappell 2014, 43.) 
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64 In this paper, I am using the philosophical concept of modality in a fairly 
commonsensical way to contrast hypothetical reasoning with reasoning about 
actual facts. In epistemology, modality usually refers to what is possible, 
necessary or impossible. Here, however, I solely focus on how thought 
experiments construct possible worlds. Consequently, I do not need to 
commit myself to any specific theory of modality. On the wider debate see the 
introduction in: Vaidya 2015. 
65 Scheppele 2005, 293. 
66 See: Luban 2014, 104; Waldron 2011, 18–19. 
67 Steinhoff 2013, 149. 
68 Walsh (2011, 476–477.) summarizes this objection effectively. I also take the 
following reference to Anscombe’s work from him. 
69 Elizabeth Anscombe made this point eloquently. See: Anscombe 1958, 17. 
70  Timothy Chappell develops an analogous idea when he claims: “An 
obvious and constantly recurring type of counter-example to a moral 
generalization tends to drive a coach and horses through the plausibility of 
that generalization; a rare and recherché type of counter-example need have 
no such effect.” (Chappell 2014, 35.) 
71 Scheppele 2005, 294. 
72  See in particular: Brecher 2007; Bufacchi and Arrigo 2006; Shue 2006; 
Wisnewski 2008. 
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73 On this point, see the excellent critique in: Fried 2014. In his review of 
Steinhoff’s book, Fried makes a creative and helpful distinction between 
hypotheticals and hypertheticals. My own suggestion to analytically separate 
“possible for us, here and now” from “possible simpliciter” chimes with 
Fried’s insistence that plausible hypotheticals contribute to a concrete and 
specific interpretation of a shared way of life, while unproductive 
hypertheticals simply stipulate an imaginary scenario that is barely 
conceivable. 
74 See, for instance, Thomson’s paper on abortion, where she defends abortion 
after consensual sex by referring to hypothetical “people seeds”, who drift 
through the air and, although you try to keep them out, still enter into your 
house through a badly protected window shield. Thompson suggests you are 
under no obligation to give these people seeds shelter even if you did not take 
perfect care to protect yourself against their intrusion. By analogy, abortion 
after consensual sex is morally permissible. See: Thomson 1971, 59. For an 
alternative interpretation of Thomson’s thought experiment see: Wisnewski 
2008, 111–112. 
75 It is a sad sign of the impoverished discourse in some corners of political 
theory that so little attention is paid to the true horror of torture practices both 
in democratic and non-democratic societies, whilst endless pages are spent on 
designing ever more extreme hypotheticals to explore whether torture can be 
deemed morally permissible. For the best summary work on the complex 
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relationship between torture and democracy, which could in many ways be 
used as a remedy to this overreliance on ideal theory, see the magisterial: 
Rejali 2007. 
76 Walsh 2011, 472–473. 
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